Less Disclosure, Better Information? The SEC's Executive Compensation Proposal

Executive compensation disclosures are intended to help investors understand how companies reward their leaders, what performance they incentivize, and whether those decisions serve the interests of shareholders.
Over time, however, the reporting requirements have become increasingly complex. Companies must produce extensive tables, calculations, and explanations that can be costly to prepare and difficult for investors to interpret.
On November 13, 2026, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed a significant overhaul of those requirements. The changes would reduce the number of executives whose compensation must be disclosed, simplify reporting tables, and give companies more flexibility in determining what information is material to investors.
The SEC argues that a more focused approach could reduce compliance costs while producing clearer, more useful disclosures.
That is a reasonable objective. More information does not automatically produce better understanding, particularly when important details become buried in lengthy reports.
But simplifying disclosure also raises questions about what investors may lose, how companies will exercise their judgment, and whether less standardized reporting could make comparisons more difficult.
The larger issue is how to balance the cost of producing information with the value that information provides to people making investment and governance decisions.
What the SEC Is Proposing
The proposed amendments to Item 402 of Regulation S-K would represent the first comprehensive overhaul of executive compensation disclosure requirements since 2006.
Among the most consequential changes is a reduction in the number of executives covered by mandatory compensation reporting.
Under existing requirements, most public companies disclose compensation for at least five named executive officers. The proposal would generally narrow that group to the principal executive officer and principal financial officer, typically the CEO and CFO.
The SEC would also replace the current primary compensation tables with three redesigned tables addressing compensation earned, compensation granted, and the status of equity awards.
Other proposed changes include:
Simplifying pay-versus-performance reporting, including reducing required performance measures and shortening the reporting period.
Revising CEO-to-median-employee pay ratio calculations to use U.S. full-time employees and requiring identification of the median employee less frequently.
Raising the aggregate reporting threshold for executive perquisites from $10,000 to $150,000.
Reducing prescribed topics in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A), giving companies greater flexibility to explain their compensation programs.
Streamlining certain director compensation, termination payment, and clawback-related disclosure requirements.
The proposal would not eliminate executive compensation reporting or relieve boards of their underlying responsibility for compensation decisions. It would substantially change how much information companies must disclose and how that information is presented.
The SEC's stated goal is to focus reporting on information that investors would consider material, rather than maintaining requirements simply because they have accumulated over time.
The challenge lies in determining which information is necessary to evaluate compensation decisions and which requirements create more cost than value.
When More Information Creates Less Clarity
The existing disclosure framework has developed over decades through regulatory amendments and congressional mandates. Requirements addressing pay ratios, pay-versus-performance, and compensation recovery were introduced for different purposes and at different times.
Taken individually, these requirements may serve legitimate objectives. Together, they can produce reports that are difficult to navigate, with overlapping explanations and calculations that do not always present a straightforward picture of what executives received or why.
A company may have a carefully designed compensation program intended to reward sustained growth, operational improvements, or long-term shareholder value. Yet investors examining its disclosures may encounter multiple figures describing compensation granted, earned, vested, or valued under different accounting methodologies.
Understanding those figures can require substantial effort.
The SEC's proposed tables attempt to address part of that problem by distinguishing compensation awarded from compensation earned and presenting the status of outstanding equity awards more clearly.
If those changes make it easier to understand when compensation is granted, when executives actually receive its value, and how equity awards develop over time, the resulting disclosures could become more useful.
There is also a legitimate business concern about the resources required to prepare increasingly complex reports.
Those resources have a cost, ultimately borne by the company and its shareholders. Reporting requirements should provide sufficient value to justify the time, expense, and administrative burden they impose.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce welcomed the proposal, arguing that existing disclosure mandates have become so complex that they can obscure the information investors need.
The question is whether simplifying the requirements will actually improve understanding or simply reduce the amount of information available.
Those outcomes are not necessarily the same.
What Investors Could Lose
Executive compensation tells investors more than how much a company's CEO earns.
It provides insight into the priorities boards establish, the behaviors they reward, and the relationship between executive incentives and business performance.
Consider a hypothetical company undergoing a major operational transformation. The CEO establishes the overall strategy, but several other senior executives are directly responsible for delivering it.
Their compensation arrangements may reveal whether the company is rewarding long-term operational improvements, short-term financial results, or milestones tied to the transformation.
If mandatory reporting focuses primarily on the CEO and CFO, investors may receive less standardized information about incentives affecting other executives who influence significant business outcomes.
That information may not be material in every company. In some organizations, the CEO and CFO's compensation arrangements may provide an adequate picture of executive incentives.
In others, the compensation of business-unit leaders or executives overseeing major operational responsibilities could provide meaningful insight into how the company is managed.
The proposed changes to pay-versus-performance reporting introduce similar considerations.
Simplifying the calculations may make the information easier to understand. But reducing the required performance measures, particularly to cumulative total shareholder return, could narrow the perspective available to investors.
Shareholder returns are important, but they do not necessarily capture every dimension of executive performance or the time horizon over which leadership decisions create value.
For example, investments in workforce capability, infrastructure, or operational resilience may produce costs before their long-term benefits become apparent. A compensation program designed around those objectives may require additional explanation to help investors understand how performance is being evaluated.
The proposed changes to pay ratio reporting could also affect comparability. Limiting the median employee calculation to U.S. full-time workers may simplify the process, but the resulting figure would no longer describe the same employee population covered by current requirements.
For companies with substantial international, part-time, or seasonal workforces, that change could materially affect how the ratio is interpreted.
The concern extends beyond whether individual figures remain available. Investors also benefit from being able to compare information across companies and over time.
When reporting becomes more discretionary, companies may choose different ways to communicate similar compensation arrangements. Some may provide detailed explanations voluntarily, while others may disclose only what is required.
That flexibility could make reports more relevant to each company's circumstances. It could also make comparisons more difficult.
The Investor Perspective Deserves Attention
The possibility of reduced disclosure has already generated concern among institutional investors.
An October 2026 survey conducted by Pay Governance and Governance Intelligence gathered responses from 83 institutional investors representing approximately $47 trillion in assets under management.
Among respondents, 73% opposed reducing the number of executives covered by compensation disclosures, while 90% opposed eliminating pay-versus-performance reporting.
The survey examined reforms being discussed before the November 13 proposal was issued, so these results should not be interpreted as investor responses to the exact amendments now under consideration. They do, however, indicate that many institutional investors place considerable value on existing disclosure requirements.
There is a reasonable concern that removing information from mandatory reports may reduce the ability to evaluate compensation practices consistently.
At the same time, preserving every existing requirement does not guarantee that investors receive useful information.
A disclosure may be technically complete but difficult to understand. A calculation may be consistent across companies while offering limited insight into how a particular compensation program operates.
The appropriate balance may differ across reporting elements.
Some standardized measures may be essential for comparability. Other information may be more useful when companies explain it in the context of their business model, strategy, and compensation decisions.
Determining which requirements fall into each category should be informed by how investors actually use the information, not simply how difficult it is for companies to produce.
What This Means for Corporate Boards
Regardless of whether the proposed amendments are adopted, boards and compensation committees should consider what their disclosures communicate about the company's priorities and governance practices.
Regulatory compliance establishes a minimum reporting obligation. It does not necessarily resolve what information stakeholders need to evaluate the decisions being made.
A company may be permitted to disclose less information under a revised rule while determining that certain additional disclosures remain valuable to its investors.
For example, a compensation committee might conclude that explaining incentives for executives beyond the CEO and CFO provides meaningful context about a major business transformation.
Another company may find that its existing reporting contains repetitive or overly technical information that contributes little to investors' understanding of its compensation decisions.
Both conclusions could be reasonable.
The more difficult judgment concerns information that is not universally necessary but may be significant under particular circumstances.
A company experiencing a leadership transition, restructuring, or major strategic change may face questions about executive incentives that differ considerably from those confronting a stable business with an established management team.
Boards should consider whether their reporting allows investors to understand how compensation decisions relate to the company's strategy, financial condition, and long-term objectives.
They should also consider the consequences of changing established disclosure practices.
Information that investors have relied on for years may continue to influence expectations even after a regulatory requirement is reduced or eliminated. Removing it without explanation could create questions about transparency, particularly when the company is already facing scrutiny over performance or governance.
Voluntary disclosure is not necessarily the answer in every case. Preparing additional information still requires resources, and excessive detail can undermine the clarity that reform is intended to achieve.
But a thoughtful reporting approach should be guided by the value of the information, not solely by the minimum amount required.
Why the Comment Period Matters
The SEC's proposal remains open for public comment. The comment period runs for 60 days following publication in the Federal Register, and the Commission has not yet established a fixed closing date on its rulemaking page.
Public companies, investors, industry associations, compensation advisers, and other stakeholders have an opportunity to provide evidence about how the proposed changes could affect reporting costs and investment decisions.
For companies, useful input might include the actual administrative burden associated with existing requirements, which disclosures are particularly costly to prepare, and whether the proposed alternatives would produce meaningful savings.
Investors may be able to explain which information they rely on when evaluating compensation practices, making voting decisions, or comparing companies.
There is also room to examine alternatives between preserving an existing requirement in full and eliminating it.
Could a particular calculation be simplified without losing its underlying value? Would more consistent definitions improve comparability? Could certain disclosures be required only when particular circumstances make them material?
These questions deserve consideration because reporting requirements can create both costs and benefits, and those effects may not be distributed equally.
Comments may be submitted through the SEC's Executive Compensation Disclosure Reform rulemaking page, File S7-2026-39.
Until a final rule is adopted and becomes effective, existing requirements remain in place.
The Broader Question of Accountability
Executive compensation disclosure sits at the intersection of regulatory compliance, corporate governance, and investor confidence.
Companies need reporting systems that are practical, understandable, and proportionate to the information's value. Investors need sufficient visibility to assess how leadership is compensated and whether those incentives align with the company's performance and long-term direction.
Neither objective is served particularly well by disclosure that is costly but uninformative, or by streamlined reporting that omits information necessary for sound decisions.
The SEC's proposal creates an opportunity to reconsider how executive compensation information is communicated and whether the current framework achieves its intended purpose.
For business leaders, the implications extend beyond potential compliance savings.
Boards will need to consider how much discretion to exercise, what information their investors expect, and whether their compensation disclosures accurately communicate the decisions and priorities guiding the organization.
A simpler regulatory framework could give companies more room to exercise judgment. The value of that flexibility will depend in part on how responsibly it is used.
The measure of successful reform should be whether investors can better understand the decisions companies make, without requiring companies to produce information that adds little value.
Achieving that balance is more complicated than reducing the number of required disclosures. It requires examining which information informs accountability, which creates unnecessary complexity, and how companies can communicate what matters most.



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